




Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a
Financial Holding Company by a Corporate
Client's Inner Circle
James A. Fanto
Brooklyn Law School, james.fanto@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
70 Brook. L. Rev. 7 (2004)
Subtle Hazards Revisited
THE CORRUPTION OF A FINANCIAL HOLDING




I argue here that the involvement of financial holding
companies (FHCs) in the recent corporate scandals shows that the
"subtle hazards" of combining commercial and investment banking
are not those identified by the United States Supreme Court in
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp. Rather, the basic subtle hazards
risk is that FHC relationship investment bankers become part of a
company client's inner circle of management and participate in
improper and often illegal transactions that benefit the inner circle at
the expense of a company's investors and its other corporate
constituencies. Investment bankers draw commercial bankers and
the FHCs within the influence of the destructive circle. I contend that
evidence from the corporate scandals shows that FHCs incurred this
risk and suffered significant harm from it. I then argue that bank
regulators need to address the risk by ensuring that a FHC has in
place procedures to keep itself and its employees from falling within
the influence of the inner circles of its investment banking clients.
The Federal Reserve, I propose, should require (and not just
recommend) FHCs to have senior transaction and relationship
oversight committees with the power necessary to review and veto
inappropriate transactions and relationships between the FHC's
investment bank or any other nonbank affiliate and their company
clients, and it should regularly evaluate the committee's performance
as part of its examination of a FHC.
© 2004 James A. Fanto. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., University of Notre Dame;
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article I inquire whether the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act' by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 enhanced
the legal and reputation risk facing commercial banking
organizations by leading these organizations to become
involved in the corporate scandals that appeared at the
bursting of the 1990s stock market bubble. Another way of
stating this inquiry is to ask whether the full entry of these
organizations into investment banking following the repeal
resurrected the "subtle hazards" identified by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Investment Co. Institute v. Camp as the
major basis for Glass-Steagall's separation of commercial from
investment banking.
The hazards deserve attention because they present a
risk (albeit now a small one) that the commercial banks and
the banking system could fail catastrophically as they did
during the Great Depression. The hazards arise as follows: if
investment and commercial banks are part of a single financial
organization, commercial banks may occasionally feel
compelled to make loans to company clients of their affiliated
investment banks or to extend credit to investors to facilitate
their purchase of a company client's securities. The hazards of
this lending lay in the commercial bankers' felt commitment to
support the affiliated investment bank's clients and customers
in order to maintain the solvency of the affiliated investment
' Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
3 Bank regulators identify certain risks, which are essentially the potential
for events that would seriously hurt a bank, that arise from the banking business. See,
e.g., OCC, DETECTING RED FLAGS IN BOARD REPORTS, A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS 2 (Oct.
2003) (listing such risks as 'credit, liquidity, interest rate, price, foreign currency
translation, compliance, strategic, reputation, and transaction"), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/rf book.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). In the discussion
below, I shall focus on a few of these risks, chiefly the compliance or legal risk, which is
"the risk to earnings or capital arising from violations of, or nonconformance with,
laws, rules, regulations, prescribed practices, or ethical standards," and reputation
risk, which is "the risk to earnings or capital arising from negative public opinion." See
OCC, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 21 (Apr. 1996),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/banksup.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
See also FEDERAL RESERVE, BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL
§2124.01.6, at 9 (Dec. 1999) ("[R]eputational risk, which is the potential that negative
publicity regarding an institution's business practices, whether true or not, will cause a
decline in the customer base, costly litigation, or revenue reductions.") (italics in
original), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/bhc/bhc0604.pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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bank. They fear that a reversal suffered by the investment
bank could affect the commercial bank through financial
contagion. That is, if stock markets fell significantly, investors
might punish commercial banks for the sins of their investment
bank affiliates by withdrawing their money from the banks,
thereby causing the banks to fail. Mounting bank failures
would cause individuals to lose faith in the banking system,
which would lead to more failures. As banks constitute the
basic foundation of investment and money flow, such
widespread failures would, in turn, end the movement of
capital throughout the economy.
The validity of the assumptions underlying Camp's
subtle hazards has recently been put to an empirical test of
sorts. By most accounts, we experienced a stock market bubble
at the end of the 1990s that was burst in part by numerous
scandals in companies and in the financial industry. As will be
discussed,' investment banking affiliates of major banking
organizations, like Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase, were
clearly involved in many of the scandals. These conglomerates
have so far incurred significant penalties,' and more may be yet
to come. There has been, however, no evidence validating the
subtle hazards rationale. Even more significantly, the
involvement of investment banks in the recent scandals has not
triggered a catastrophic failure of the large complex banking
institutions (LCBOs),7 many of which are regulated as financial
holding companies (FHCs).' The results of this natural
experiment may suggest that the concern over subtle hazards
had little basis in fact and led for many years to the
inappropriate separation of commercial and investment
banking.
4 For a discussion of the reasons for the bubble before it burst, see generally
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000).
5 See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part III.
This is a term of art for banking conglomerates that are engaged in
multiple financial services. See, e.g., Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision
of Large Complex Banking Organizations, 87 FED. RES. BULL. 47, 47 (Feb. 2001).
8 The financial holding company is the new banking organization that
Gramm-Leach-Bliley created, in essence, to supplement the bank holding company.
The major difference between it and the other structure is that the financial holding
company and its nonbanking affiliates can engage in a broad range of financial
activities, such as insurance and securities activities, rather than be restricted to




I argue, however, that the involvement of banking
organizations in the recent corporate scandals has given a new
life to Camp's subtle hazards, if reformulated in social
psychological terms. In my view, the basic subtle hazards risk
is that investment bankers embrace the perspective of a client
company's management and become part of management's
inner circle, whether in raising capital, advising on a merger,
or structuring another financial transaction or product. Like
other corporate advisors (outside accountants and lawyers
come to mind), these bankers participate in transactions that
benefit management's inner circle (of which they are a part) at
the expense of outside investors and other corporate
constituencies. In this participation, investment bankers draw
related commercial bankers and the entire financial
organization within the cohesive, but destructive, circle of the
corporate client. I contend that the evidence from the corporate
scandals shows that FHC investment bankers became
members of corporate inner circles and pulled their institutions
into the scandals. While FHCs were not the only institutions
involved, they may have been particularly prone to the subtle
hazards risk because they were competing with traditional
investment banks to deliver a complete array of financial
services to corporate clients.
I draw several conclusions from the reformulated subtle
hazards. In my view, the evidence does not justify a return to
Glass-Steagall's separation of commercial from investment
banking, which renewed separation, in any event, would be
politically impossible and perhaps even economically
undesirable if its demise has benefited consumers by enhancing
competition in financial services. I contend, however, that this
reformulation of the subtle hazards risk should alert bank
regulators to be aware of how FHCs became involved in the
corporate scandals and to try to prevent a recurrence of this
involvement. Bank regulators cannot ignore the ever-present, if
remote, legal and reputation risks recognized in Camp that
consumers will lose confidence in the FHC and its banks
because of the FHC's participation in the scandals. Bank
regulators need to ensure that a FHC has instituted procedures
to keep itself and its employees from falling within the
9 For the market reaction to the legislation, see generally Faith R. Neale &
Pamela P. Peterson, The Financial Services Industry and the Modernization
Legislation (Sept. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=447420 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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influence of the inner circles of its investment banking clients.
A FHC must have a senior level transaction and relationship
oversight committee with the power to review and veto
inappropriate transactions and relationships between the
FHC's investment bank or any other affiliate, on the one hand,
and company clients, on the other, and this power should not
be regularly overridden by the chief executives of the FHC.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I examine in
more detail the contrast between Camp's presentation of the
subtle hazards and my social psychological reformulation of
them. In Part III, I review representative evidence of the
involvement of investment banks and other affiliates of the
FHCs in the corporate scandals, with particular focus on their
participation in the Enron and the WorldCom scandals. I
discuss in Part IV my proposal for a required transaction and
relationship oversight committee for FHCs and observe that it
has in fact been mandated in several cases as part of a written
agreement entered into between the financial institutions and
banking regulators as a result of the formers' involvement in
the scandals. The Article concludes in Part V.
II. THE SUBTLE HAZARDS, THEN AND Now
A. Subtle Hazards in Camp
In Camp, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the
subtle hazards of affiliating commercial banks with investment
banks in the same organization went beyond the risk that
there would be little advantage to linking these different kinds
of business" or that commercial banks would themselves be
tempted to invest their assets in the stock market. Rather, the
hazards came from financial contagion. In enacting Glass-
Steagall, Congress recognized that the ultimate worry of a
commercial banking organization is the depositors' loss of
confidence in its banks, a sentiment that is at times irrational."
Since depositors often do not distinguish between a bank and a
non-banking affiliate, the organization is inevitably concerned
'0 1 leave aside the consideration of whether Camp, a case decided years after
the enactment of Glass-Steagall, accurately reflected Congress's justification for the
separation of investment and commercial banking. For a discussion of this subject, see
Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on
the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314,323-30 (1990).
" See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 631 (1971).
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with how the public views each of its affiliates and even its
major clients. If problems develop in a securities affiliate or its
clients, the bank's executives may feel compelled to shore up
the affiliate or clients in order to prevent the contagion from
infecting the bank. Banks may, for example, offer their
affiliates or clients loans that they would not otherwise have
made. Indeed, they might make these unsound loans to these
parties even before any problems surface. They would do this to
prevent the banks' depositors and other customers from
transferring to the banks their concerns or doubts about the
affiliate or its clients, even if this transfer were unjustified and
thus irrational. 2
According to the Court, a related subtle hazard is the
risk that depositors might punish a banking organization if
they viewed it as having improperly fueled a speculative stock
market bubble. 3 In other words, the bank's felt obligation to
ensure the success of its securities affiliate might compromise
its impartiality in offering investment advice to its depositors
by inducing it to market securities underwritten by its
securities affiliate or lend money to its depositors and other
customers to purchase securities dealt in by the affiliate, or
even, in the interest of promoting the stock market generally,
securities sold by an unrelated broker-dealer." If the securities
markets fell, investors would blame the banks for their losses,"5
as they would perceive them to be institutions that benefited
from and encouraged securities speculation while failing to
protect adequately its depositors, many of whom had little
investing experience.
The ultimate subtle hazard recognized by the Court was
that the combination of commercial and investment banking
12 See id. The Court explained this potentially destructive process as follows:
For example, pressures are created because the bank and the affiliate are
closely associated in the public mind, and should the affiliate fare badly,
public confidence in the bank might be impaired. And since public confidence
is essential to the solvency of a bank, there might exist a natural temptation
to shore up the affiliate through unsound loans or other aid.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13 See id.
14 See id. at 632.
' See id. The Court stated:
Congress feared that the promotional needs of investment banking might
lead commercial banks to lend their reputation for prudence and restraint to
the enterprise of selling particular stocks and securities, and that this could
not be done without that reputation being undercut by the risks necessarily




might significantly change and corrupt the nature of
commercial banking. Throughout its discussion, the Court
contrasted the aggressive and salesman-oriented mentality of
investment bankers with the impartial, prudent, and
disinterested fiduciary disposition of commercial bankers."6 The
Court explained that, should the two functions be mixed,
ordinary people could no longer look to the banker as a source
of disinterested investment advice, for they would always
suspect that the banker was influenced by a concern to promote
the welfare of affiliated investment bankers in making his or
her investment recommendations."
As is now well known, this view of subtle hazards and
the justification for Glass-Steagall became the object of
considerable economic and financial criticism."8 Thoroughly
discredited, the Glass-Steagall Act met its demise when the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act put an end to the formal separation
between investment and commercial banking.'9 Why, it was
,6 See Camp, 401 U.S. at 630-31. The Court stated:
The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also
had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that arise
when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or
managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly
or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments. This
course places new promotional and other pressures on the bank which in turn
create new temptations.
Id.; id. at 632 ("Senator Glass made it plain that it was 'the fixed purpose of Congress'
not to see the facilities of commercial banking diverted into speculative operations by
the aggressive and promotional character of the investment banking business.")
(footnote omitted).
17 See id. at 633 ("Another potential hazard that very much concerned
Congress arose from the plain conflict between the promotional interest of the
investment banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disinterested
investment advice.").
is The criticism leveled at Glass-Steagall was aimed at Camp's reading of the
Act, as well as Congress's other justifications for the commercial and investment bank
separation. For an argument that Glass-Steagall represented nothing more than a
protectionist move by investment banks to prevent competition from commercial
banks, see RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS 219-24 (2003). See also ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN
FINANCE FOR THE 21st CENTURY 27 (1998). They explain:
Other factors were at work as well: evidence suggests that the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act was largely a punitive measure aimed at several large banks
that had engaged in securities abuses (as many securities firms that were
unaffiliated with banks had also done) rather than a device for assuring bank
safety.
Id. at 27; FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION AND FINANCIAL
STABILITY 71 (1996) ("It is now widely accepted that Glass-Steagall restrictions are not
necessary to maintain bank soundness or financial stability.") (citations omitted).
'9 The reasons for the repeal of Glass-Steagall are admittedly complex. Under
one account, the growth in the capital markets came at the expense of commercial
banking, so that banking organizations were forced to enter into investment banking
2004]
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asked, would a rational banking organization pour good money
after bad, jeopardizing its own business and reputation, by
shoring up a failing securities affiliate (or the affiliate's
corporate clients)? The contagion risk of depositors transferring
their mistrust of the securities affiliate to the bank could be
addressed by keeping the bank "quarantined" from the
securities affiliate, policing transactions between them, and,
most importantly, by alerting bank customers and depositors to
this separation so they would have no reason to lose confidence
in the bank if troubles developed elsewhere in the organization.
Moreover, federal insurance for bank deposits would prevent
depositors from worrying unduly about the performance of
bank affiliates 0 By the same token, a banking organization
would have no long-term incentive to risk its reputation by
encouraging its depositors and other customers to make
improperly speculative investments. If, as is generally the case,
a bank is a "repeat player" in financial markets, it has every
reason to perform its securities-related activities, like all its
activities, with care and prudence. It is rational for a banking
organization to help its customers invest wisely.
Finally, critics of Glass-Steagall posed a powerful
existential question: are commercial bankers so different from
investment bankers? Like investment bankers, commercial
bankers specialize in capital raising, investments, and finance.
They, too, make money on the spread between an investment's
total return and the return to their clients, or on transaction-
based fees. It is true, as a historical matter, that commercial
bankers offered a limited range of financial products. But this
was not a sign so much of their prudence as it was a result of
the legal limitations on banking business. Indeed, as the
argument went, confidence in banks should grow when banks
and bank holding companies are allowed to engage in a well-
diversified range of financial activities that they could offer to
their businesses and individual customers."
(for which they were well qualified) in order to survive. They made use of loopholes in
Glass-Steagall to engage in investment banking until Gramm-Leach-Bliley completely
removed the restrictions. See generally JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 554-57 (3d ed. 2001).
20 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1815 (2004); 12 C.F.R. pt. 330 (2004) (for deposit
insurance).
21 See Garten, supra note 10, at 322-23 (discussing advantages of
diversification in bank activities).
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B. Social Psychological Reformulation of Subtle Hazards
I propose revitalizing the subtle hazards of combining
commercial and investment banking identified in Camp by
grounding the hazards in social psychology. To understand my
reformulation, it is first necessary to recognize that Camp
discusses subtle hazards on the basis of particular assumptions
about human behavior. The Court assumes that commercial
bankers, and even investment bankers, act rationally while
depositors and other bank customers often do not. In the
Court's view, although a rational commercial banker might not
want to support the troubled securities affiliate or the affiliate's
clients, the banker feels compelled to do so in order to prevent
depositors from irrationally punishing the bank for this
unrelated problem. A similar dilemma faces the commercial
banker in deciding whether to make loans to customers to
facilitate their purchasing of securities: either rationally to
profit from lending and risk the irrational wrath of depositors if
and when the securities markets fall, for whatever reason, or to
forego the profit from the loan. By separating commercial from
investment banking, Glass-Steagall removes commercial
bankers from these dilemmas, where either action or inaction
by the banker makes perfect sense.
It is not my goal here to discuss the accuracy of the
Court's views about depositor behavior in a panic, although I
believe there is considerable evidence that individuals do not
act rationally in financial panics.22 Rather, I propose that the
subtle hazards of combining commercial and investment
banking in one organization lie in the limitedly rational
thinking and behavior of investment and commercial bankers,
even if it would be difficult to contend that this thinking and
behavior are completely irrational. I support this assertion by
returning to Camp's emphasis on the promotional,
salesmanship aspect of investment banking. I suggest that the
risk here, in social psychological terms, is that an investment
banker will adopt the perspective of its company client when
advising the company on a capital raising, merger or
acquisition, or another financial transaction or product instead
of maintaining a critical distance from that client. More
specifically, an investment banker's client-driven,
22 The classic work on this subject is CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS,
PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (3d ed. 1996).
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salesmanship orientation makes the banker particularly
susceptible to being swept into the team or inner circle of
company management, thus losing his or her distance from the
company. As part of such a circle, the banker would focus on
facilitating its goals, thus benefiting the group and him or
herself, and would forget or ignore his or her responsibilities to
the larger organization of which he or she is a part.
Although investment bankers and their clients
unquestionably benefit from this team-oriented approach," the
social psychological concern arises when an inner circle
becomes excessively cohesive and inner-focused. Joining this
kind of team may benefit the banker in the short run, but may
ultimately hurt the banker, his or her investment bank, and
the FHC. Considerable social psychological evidence shows that
members of excessively cohesive groups often act for the
group's sole benefit despite an explicit mission to do otherwise
(e.g., to act on behalf of a larger organization, such as a
corporation, of which the group is an important part).' A group
can transform its members so that they adopt uniform views
and become hostile to dissenters and outsiders. 5 The group's
continued existence and prosperity become the exclusive goals
of its members, who share in this prosperity in varying
degrees. Such a group generally forms around a key individual
or leader, like a company's chief executive officer, who
represents and espouses the group's ideals. Social psychologists
who study the formation of these unnaturally cohesive groups
explain this behavior in terms of a perversion of the natural
23 As an accepted member of a client's management group, the investment
banker could understand better, and thus contribute to achieving, the client's business
goals. There is considerable research on the benefits of group work and decision-
making. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, Are Two Heads Better Than One?:
An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Individual Decisionmaking, in NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 7909 (Sept. 2000) (presenting
experimental data showing that groups outperform individuals), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7909 (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
This characteristic of excessively cohesive groups is called "groupthink," as
discussed in Irving Janis' classic account. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPrrINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 174-77 (2d ed. 1982). See
also Michael A. Hogg & Sarah C. Hains, Friendship and Group Identification: A New
Look at the Role of Cohesiveness in Groupthink, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323, 337
(1998).
25 See JANIS, supra note 24, at 242-59; Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J.
Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as
Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 499 (1999).
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and ordinary search by individuals for social identity and for
certainty in unsettling environments.26
I contend (as I have argued elsewhere)27 that evidence
available from the corporate scandals in firms like Enron and
WorldCom shows that inner circles in those firms exemplified
the destructively cohesive groups described by social
psychologists. The circles included top executives, board
members, and key corporate advisors, such as outside
accountants and lawyers. Significantly, investment as well as
commercial bankers, including those from FHCs, joined their
ranks.
To recapitulate, my reformulated subtle hazards arise
as follows: an investment banker of a bank affiliated with a
commercial bank in a FHC joins the inner circle of one of his or
her corporate clients and participates in or facilitates the
destructive and illegal actions of the circle for the benefit of
group members, including the banker. This membership in
turn insinuates itself into the FHC, sometimes at the highest
executive levels, and the FHC ignores established policies in
order for the banker to maintain good relations with the inner
circle. The FHC's involvement in the scandal ultimately
presents significant legal and reputation risks to the FHC. A
look at the evidence of the corporate scandals shows that this
reformulation of Camp's subtle hazards helps explain how
commercial banking organizations became involved in them in
the first instance.
26 In essence, groupthink is simply a natural process taken to extremes: we
all obtain much of our identification from groups; it is just that, in groupthink, one's
self identification with a group becomes harmful. See Michael A. Hogg & Barbara A.
Mullin, Joining Groups to Reduce Uncertainty: Subjective Uncertainty Reduction and
Group Identification, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION 248, 254 (Dominic
Abrams & Michael A. Hogg eds., 1999). For the role of groups in uncertainty reduction,
see id. at 267.
17 See James A. Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering
Corporate Inner Circles, 83 ORE. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). In a comment on this
Article, Professor Samuel L. Hayes III observed that investment bankers do not
cultivate long-term relationships with corporate clients, nor do the clients want them.
The evidence below on Enron suggests that this is not always the case. In any event, a
team can still form around a transaction or project and it may be particularly
destructive to an organization since it focuses on its benefit from the project, rather
than on the project's good for the organization.
20041
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III. EVIDENCE OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBTLE
HAZARDS IN THE CORPORATE SCANDALS
Evidence available from the corporate scandals suggests
that investment bankers of FHCs became members of
corporate inner circles and, as such, actively participated in at
least some of the corporate scandals. This participation, along
with the acquiescence of others within the institutions, created
legal and reputation risk for the institutions. The evidence is
still being uncovered, as are the scandals themselves, but there
is enough of it to support my point. The following discussion is
only exemplary and is limited to FHC involvement in the
Enron and the WorldCom scandals.28
A. Enron
It is well known that the Enron affair involved
considerable manipulation of the company's financial results
accomplished primarily through the use of special purpose
entities (SPEs).29 The manipulators, not all of whom have been
fully identified or prosecuted," transferred assets off Enron's
28 By so limiting myself to a few examples, I recognize that I may be accused
of falling victim to a well-established psychological heuristic of finding a risk present
simply because it is "vivid" or available, rather than because it is established through a
systematic empirical study. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1, 5 (Cass. R. Sunstein ed., 2000). I have no defense to this accusation,
other than to say that, as discussed below, federal banking regulators have concluded
from their review of bank and broker activities that financial institution involvement
in the scandals was widespread enough to merit general regulatory action.
29 For a detailed discussion of this scandal, see William Powers, Jr., Report of
Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of
Enron Corporation (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/
pdfs/PowersReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); First Interim Report of Neal Batson,
In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002); Second Interim Report
of Neal Batson, Court Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (focusing on role of special purpose entities in the fraud); Third
Interim Report of Neal Batson, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the role of financial institutions in aiding Enron's fraud);
Final Report of Neal Batson, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003) (discussing the role of Enron's advisors and financial institutions in aiding
Enron's fraud); Report of Harrison J. Goldin, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing, among other things, involvement of financial
institutions in Enron's fraud). See also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and ERISA
Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613-37 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (describing in detail the Enron
scandal).
30 One of the major perpetrators, former Enron Chief Financial Officer
Andrew Fastow, pleaded guilty to, among other things, securities fraud, and will
receive a sentence of ten years in prison. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Fastow,
Cr. No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. 2004), available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
enronluslfastowll404plea.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004). Enron Chairman and CEO
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books to the SPEs and had Enron engage in sham transactions
with these vehicles. The demand for considerable financial
expertise in executing these complicated transactions led to the
involvement of financial professionals, including investment
bankers. In many cases, the bankers came from FHC-affiliated
investment banks. To be sure, the SPEs and these transactions
were structured financings that also involved FHC commercial
banks, but, as discussed below, they were generally
spearheaded by the investment banking division.
Among other services, a financial institution, through a
SPE, loaned money to Enron by disguising the transaction as
commodity purchases (these were the "prepay" transactions).
This, in turn, generated for the institution interest on the
loans, as well as investment banking fees for structuring the
SPE and the transaction." Other structured financings
included sales of assets to a SPE that was funded by a financial
institution." In order to maintain the fiction that the SPE was
a separate entity and to show Enron's insiders that the
institution was committed to Enron, the institution also
generally made a small equity investment in each SPE. The
financial institution invariably received a high return on this
investment, as did the Enron insiders, like Andrew Fastow,
who were the other equity investors. Moreover, because Enron
agreed to buy back the equity, the institution's investment was
never at risk. These transactions generated false revenues for
Enron and removed from its balance sheet assets that might
otherwise have declined in value.
Congressional hearings and the special reports of
Enron's bankruptcy examiner, Neal Batson, revealed how
FHCs played a considerable role in these structured
financings.3 Of the several examples showing this FHC
involvement, the best of them involves Citigroup. Enron
ranked financial institutions doing business with it in three
tiers. Not surprisingly, since Citigroup averaged one
transaction a month with Enron for the period of 1997-2001,
Kenneth Lay and President Jeffrey Skilling have been indicted on securities fraud, and
other charges. See Superceding Indictment, United States v. Causey, 309 F. Supp. 2d
917 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-04-25 (S2)).
31 For a description of the prepay transactions, see Second Interim Report of
Neal Batson, supra note 29, at 58-66 & app. E.
32 See id. at 104-12, apps. L & M.
33 See supra note 29. See also The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron's
Collapse: Hearing Before S. Comm. Gov't Affairs, Permanent Subcomm. of
Investigations, 107th Cong., 107-618, VOLS. 1-2 (2002).
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reaping $188 million in revenues, Enron designated Citigroup
a top-tier bank.' The story of Citigroup's involvement with
Enron is one in which an entire FHC was gradually corrupted
through its investment banking division's close affiliation with
Enron's inner circle. This affiliation pulled Citigroup within the
influence of that circle, even though it was not in Citigroup's
ultimate interest. It is important to be clear here: a FHC such
as Citigroup services its clients by delivering a package of
financial services such as capital raising, structured financing,
and loans. Investment and commercial bankers work together
as a team to deliver services to a client."3 This approach makes
it easier for investment bankers to involve those from other
bank operations in questionable client activity.
Citigroup's financial sins in the Enron affair are legion.
In essence, Citigroup's relationship bankers wholeheartedly
accepted the goal of Enron's management of disguising the true
financial picture of the company. For example, Citigroup
bankers actually proposed to Enron insiders and structured
many of the SPE transactions that were designed to allow
Enron to give a misleading presentation of its financial
situation. In Project Nahanni, the bankers came up with the
idea that Enron sell Treasury bonds and report the sale as cash
from operating activities from a sale of merchant investments
for year-end 1999 (so as to improve year-end cash flows).' This
initiative makes sense, functionally demonstrating Citigroup's
bankers' commitment to Enron's inner circle.
The ready participation of Citigroup investment
bankers in Enron's inner circle gradually drew others in the
banking organization within the conspiracy. Citigroup's
internal accountants, for instance, knew that Enron's
accounting treatment with respect to the SPEs was improper."
Citigroup engaged in the structured financings even though its
Global Capital Group had a policy of avoiding participation in
These transactions included securities underwritings (21), loans (21),
structured financings (14), and M&A (4). As a result of this involvement, Citigroup has
an exposure of $2.4 billion to Enron in the firm's bankruptcy. See Third Interim Report
of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at app. D, at 5, 11-21.
35 See id. at app. D, at 8-10 (describing Citigroup's approach to the delivery
of client services).
36 See id. at app. D, at 107-15. The ridiculousness of categorizing a sale of
U.S. Treasuries as a merchant bank investment is apparent. However, no Citigroup
investment banker has so far been indicted regarding Citigroup's participation in the
Enron scandal.
17 See id. at 56-57.
[Vol. 70:1
SUBTLE HAZARDS REVISITED
transactions with a client that could mislead investors about
the financial state of the firm.38 In fact, Citigroup regularly
ignored its credit risk limits for Enron, 3 and it appears to have
fired an equity analyst who was critical of Enron and hired one
from another bank who was recommended by Enron." Most
damning of all, the FHC failed to disclose to public investors,
regulators, and bond rating agencies its full knowledge of
Enron's liabilities, which lack of disclosure allowed it to lessen
its own exposure to Enron by selling Enron securities to other
investors. 1 In sum, the Enron-structured financings corrupted
many in Citigroup.
Citigroup has not emerged unscathed from its
involvement with Enron. Ultimately agreeing to pay a $101
million penalty in its settlement with the SEC over the Enron
affair, Citigroup essentially admitted that it had contributed
to' and had been a cause of, Enron's violation of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 based upon Enron's
misleading presentation of its financial condition."2 As part of
this settlement, Citigroup entered into a written agreement
with the Federal Reserve Board whereby it undertook to revise
its participation in structured finance by implementing more
effective monitoring and disclosure systems with respect to
such transactions." Citigroup also faces private, class action
securities law suits for its role in the fraud" as well as potential
subordination of its claims against Enron in bankruptcy court.4"
' See id. at 53-54.
39 See Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at app. D, at 21-24.
40 See id. at app. D, at 30-32.
41 See id. at app. D, at 43-44.
42 See In re Citigroup, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48230, [2001-2003
Transfer Binder] SEC Accounting R. (CCH) 6037 (July 28, 2003). The total penalty
was in fact $120 million since it also included Citigroup's participation in Dynergy's
misleading presentation of its financial condition.
43 See Written Agreement by and between Citigroup Inc. & Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcementl
2003/20030728/attachment.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
" See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 642-44 (S.D. Tex. 2002). Citigroup has established reserves of $6.7 billion for its
exposure to these suits and other litigation. See Press Release, Citigroup, Citigroup
Reaches Settlement on WorldCom Class Action Litigation for $1.64 Billion After-Tax
(May 10, 2004), http://www.citigroup.com/citigroup/press/2004/data/ 040510a.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
45 See Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at app. D, at 6-7.
See also Complaint, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, at 56-60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003),
available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/eciti92403advprcd.pdf (Enron's




JP Morgan Chase also participated in the Enron
scandal."6 Like Citigroup, it was a top-tier Enron bank, with a
similar transaction history with Enron during the 1996-2000
period when the scandal evolved: its transactions generated
$86.3 million in revenues for this financial institution.47 Indeed,
Enron was one of JP Morgan Chase's best clients during this
period.4" As in the case of Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase's
investment bankers structured many of the misleading SPE
transactions with the participation of others in the banking
group, which in turn led to the corruption of the FHC. These
bankers were the ones who came up with the structure of the
notorious Mahonia transactions, which were designed to give a
misleading picture of Enron's financial position. By presenting
commodities to be delivered at a future date as "prepays," and
thus as cash flow from operating activities, Enron was able to
disguise what were in fact unsecured loans from JP Morgan
Chase to Enron that should have been recognized as cash flows
from financing." The prepays thus increased Enron's operating
cash flow and decreased its debt by material amounts.' The
corruption in JP Morgan Chase from its design of and
participation in the prepays was insidious. On the one hand,
bank officers properly presented the transactions to the FHC's
regulators as loans to Enron, rather than as commodity
purchases, and always recognized the substance of the
transaction internally." On the other hand, many JP Morgan
Chase executives knew that rating agencies and investors did
not understand the purpose of these complex financings and
yet made no effort to illuminate them.2
Like Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase has not emerged
unscathed from its Enron involvement. As a result of litigation
with insurance companies over surety bonds backstopping
Enron's exposure on the prepay contracts (the companies
claimed that they did not know that they were backstopping
loans), JP Morgan Chase agreed to claim only 50% of the
46 See Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at app. E, at 5-17.
47 See id. at app. E, at 5-12.
See id. at app. E, at 9-12 (discussing Enron's status as a favored "blue"
client).
49 See id. at app. E, at 18-57.
5o See id. at app. E, at 21-22.
51 Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at app. E, at 37-42.
52 See id. at app. E, at 43-53.
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surety bond amount. 3 It, too, settled with the SEC (for $135
million) on a complaint alleging that it had aided and abetted
Enron's securities fraud,' and it entered into a written
agreement with the Federal Reserve to improve its monitoring
of its structured finance.5 Also like Citigroup, JP Morgan
Chase is facing securities class actions over Enron's demise,
suits from lenders that participated in its Enron loan facilities,
and equitable subordination of its claims in Enron's
bankruptcy.'
Unfortunately, the FHCs involved in Enron's fraud do
not end with Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase. In the Bammel
transaction, 7 Enron and Bank of America formed a SPE that
"purchased" natural gas from Enron (the SPE was funded by
small equity contributions from each party and a large loan
from Bank of America) and then allowed Enron to "use" the gas
and pay fees on the use. Enron also agreed to "sell" the gas for
the SPE, but bore the risk that the sale proceeds would be less
than the SPE's purchase price. This transaction was nothing
more than a disguised loan from Bank of America to Enron,
which allowed Enron to overstate revenue and cash flow and to
disguise its liabilities.' Royal Bank of Canada, a foreign bank
holding company, engaged in similar transactions with Enron
through the structured financing group of its capital markets
division, which again resulted in a misleading financial
53 For the lawsuit, see JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 233
F. Supp. 2d 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
See In re J.P. Morgan Chase, Litigation Release No. 18252 (July 28, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.govflitigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2003).
" See Written Agreement by and among J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Federal
Reserve Bank of New York & N.Y. State Banking Dep't (July 28, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/enforcement/2003/200307282/attachmen
t.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
JP Morgan Chase's exposure to Enron is $1.8 billion in its bankruptcy,
which risks being equitably subordinated. See Third Interim Report of Neal Batson,
supra note 29, at app. E, at 2-4; see also Complaint, In re Enron Corp., supra note 45.
On the lawsuit from banks that participated in the syndicated facilities supporting the
Enron SPEs, see UniCredito Italiano SPA v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 288 F. Supp. 2d
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). On the securities law class action, see In re Enron Corp. Sec.,
Derivative and ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 639-42 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
5' See Report of Harrison J. Goldin, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG),
28-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
58 See id. at 43-45. Enron was in effect trying to "monetize" gas that could




presentation of Enron.' The involvement of these and other
FHCs in the Enron fraud was so extensive that Enron's
bankruptcy examiner could conclude from the evidence that
FHCs had aided and abetted, or contributed to, Enron's
creation of false accounting statements, as well as breaches of
duties by Enron's officers and directors.'
Does this participation by the FHCs in the Enron fraud
make sense within the perspective of Camp's subtle hazards?
For the most part, the answer seems to be no. There is little
evidence that, during their dealings with Enron, Citigroup, JP
Morgan Chase and the other FHCs tried to maintain the
company through loans and other financial help out of a
rational fear that its failure could hurt the FHCs' investment
banks and eventually, through a loss of depositor confidence,
their commercial banks. Nor does it appear that, for the same
reason, the FHCs encouraged investors to purchase Enron
securities. FHC executives were concerned about the
reputation risk that threatened their institution due to their
transactions with Enron, but the concern was never acute.
Simply put, the FHC executives were not worried that their
institution would fail from this activity.
Rather, my reformulation of the subtle hazards-the
social psychological attraction of a client's inner circle for
investment bankers, who then draw in others in the affiliated
FHC-better explains the participation of the FHCs in the
Enron scandal. Enron's "deal flow" motivated the bankers and
their superiors: it was in their self-interest for their institution
to be among Enron's top-tier banks. However, in order to be in
this tier, the bankers were required to accede to Enron's
demands, which meant structuring financings in accordance
with the goals of Enron's inner circle. Accordingly, if Andrew
Fastow needed to enhance Enron's cash flow and hide its
" See id. at 92-130. It is interesting that the main Royal Bank of Canada
bankers involved in the Enron transactions had all come from NatWest of London,
where they had previously worked with Enron on similarly misleading transactions.
See id. at 97-98.
60 See Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at 103. The other banking
institutions involved in the Enron scandal include: UBS Warburg AG, see Report of
Harrison J. Goldin, supra note 57, at 173-201; Barclays Bank, Deutsche Bank, and
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, see Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra
note 29, at 65-81; Royal Bank of Scotland, Credit Suisse First Boston, and Toronto
Dominion Bank, see Final Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at 66-81.
61 As discussed infra text accompanying note 94, as a result of the scandals,




liabilities, or if he wished to increase its revenues for year-end,
the bankers had to design the appropriate new product and
transaction structure, such as Citigroup's idea to sell treasury
bonds as a merchant banking investment or JP Morgan
Chase's pre-paid commodities contracts. Although, as discussed
above, many executives in the FHCs knew that Enron had
misrepresented its financial results through these transactions,
they rarely questioned the behavior of their institution. By this
point, the FHC's Enron relationship bankers' desire to be part
of Enron's team had infiltrated and corrupted the FHC. Enron
bankruptcy examiner Neal Batson drives home this point when
he describes the criteria used by Enron for designating a FHC
a tier one bank.2 Among other things, Enron looked to the
existence of a relationship (as opposed to a transactional)
approach towards Enron, an ability to structure complex,
mission-critical deals, and an account officer "capable of
delivering institution." To be a top-tier Enron bank, in other
words, meant that the entire FHC had to become a dependable
member of Enron's inner circle despite the reputation risk this
membership posed for the institution.
B. WorldCom and Other Scandals
The WorldCom scandal involved massive accounting
fraud in that the company transformed significant liabilities
into capital assets so that its financial results would look better
than those of its competitors in the volatile telecommunications
industry.' The conspirators perpetrated the fraud in order to
62 See Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at 46 n.121.
0 This fraud was straightforward and "classic." Expenses reduce income in
the year incurred, whereas an expense transformed into a capital asset need only be
expensed over the life of that asset. In other words, the WorldCom fraud involved
deferring the recognition of expenses, which made WorldCom appear to be in better
financial shape than many of its competitors. For detailed descriptions of the
WorldCom fraud, see DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC.
(Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.comhdocs/docs/worldcom/
bdspcomm609O3rpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004); First Interim Report of Dick
Thornburgh, In re WorldCom Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); Second
Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, In re WorldCom Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) 188-90
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, In re WorldCom
Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing in more detail the fraud
and potential causes of action against participants); In re WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig.,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8245 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02-Civ-3288). See also Richard C.
Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to The Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York on Corporate Governance for the Future of
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keep WorldCom's stock price high, allowing the stock to be
used as acquisition currency and preventing the exposure of
the excessive debt of its CEO, Bernie Ebbers.' WorldCom's
internal auditors ultimately exposed the scandal,' and
WorldCom entered into bankruptcy, from which it is only now
reemerging as MCI.
The participation of FHCs in this scandal appears to be
less widespread than it was in Enron mainly because the
WorldCom fraud did not involve the use of SPEs and
structured finance, which demand intensive investment
banking involvement. Nonetheless, it was significant. To take a
prominent example, it is alleged (and, in some cases,
undisputed) that Citigroup, through its investment bank,
Salomon Smith Barney, turned a blind eye to the WorldCom
fraud because of its efforts to capture WorldCom's investment
banking business. Between 1997 and 2002, Salomon was the
main investment bank for WorldCom and received more than
$107 million in investment banking fees from that company.'
Citigroup essentially garnered much of this business through
bribery, allotting shares of "hot" IPOs underwritten by
Salomon to WorldCom executives like Ebbers. 7 Significantly,
Salomon's infamous telecommunications analyst, Jack
Grubman, gave and maintained the investment bank's highest
stock rating for WorldCom, even though he had no basis for
this rating and may even have been skeptical about
MCI, Inc. 20-24 (Aug. 2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/
corpgov82603rpt.pdf.
In a situation where truth is stranger than fiction, Ebbers pledged his
company stock to financial institutions for loans in the amount of $400 million and
used the loan proceeds to make many bad investments. As the value of his stock
collateral fell, the banks demanded repayment, which he could not make, so WorldCom
itself assumed from the banks the loans to its CEO. See Second Interim Report of Dick
Thornburgh, supra note 63, at 12.
65 For a discussion of the uncovering of this scandal, see Susan Pulliam &
Deborah Solomon, How Three Unlikely Sleuths Exposed Fraud at WorldCorn, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 30, 2002, at Al (describing the story of how internal audit chief Cynthia Cooper
and her team unearthed the WorldCom accounting fraud and tracked it through
company accounts despite some resistance from executives engaged in the fraud).
See Third and Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, supra note 63, at 137-40.
67 This refers to an initial public offering that underwriters expect to rise
precipitously above the offer price in the first day (or even hours) of trading. Executives
who receive shares of these IPOs risk nothing: the bank advances them money to make
the purchase and then sells the shares, with the executive simply pocketing the




WorldCom's financial results-all in order to maintain
Citigroup's relationship with WorldCom.'
While the Citigroup/WorldCom relationship clearly
involved corrupt self-interest, it also makes sense in the social
psychological terms that I have laid out: the corruption of a
FHC through its investment bankers' association with a client's
inner circle. There is no question that Salomon investment
bankers, most particularly Grubman himself, became part of
the WorldCom's inner circle. After all, Grubman attended
WorldCom board meetings and gave WorldCom strategic
advice, particularly regarding the company's relationship with
Wall Street.' As in the case of Citigroup and Enron, this inner
circle membership of Citigroup bankers was critical for
bringing the rest of the FHC within the circle's influence. While
the closeness of the Salomon bankers and analysts to
WorldCom made sense in the short run, in the long run it
seriously harmed the reputation of Citigroup and exposed it to
significant legal liability."
Details of FHC involvement in other corporate scandals
are yet fully to emerge. Yet there is little question that, in
many cases, as in Enron and WorldCom, investment bankers
associated with FHCs joined company inner circles and
"delivered" their institution to the circles. For example, Freddie
Mac, the quasi-public provider of funds for housing mortgage
loans, also prepared misleading financial results, often through
transactions with SPEs structured by FHCs (including
Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase)." And, as the scandals related
to mutual funds unfold, wherever favored investors were
allowed to trade in fund shares in ways that injured ordinary
' See id. at 204.
69 See First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, supra note 63, at 81-104. See
also Attorney General of the State of New York Bureau of Investment Protection, In re
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (formerly known as Salomon Smith Barney Inc.),
Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63(15), at 51-52 (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ssb/nyagciti42803aod.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004).
70 Citigroup has paid a $400 million penalty for its misleading analyst
activities (including those in the case of WorldCom). See In re Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., supra note 69, at 58. It has also agreed to pay $2.65 billion ($1.64 billion
after tax) to settle private securities law suits against it over its participation in the
WorldCom fraud. See Citigroup Inc., Form 8-K (May 10, 2004), available at
http'//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000104746904016537/0001047469-04-
016537-index.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
71 See OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
EXAMINATION OF FREDDIE MAC 74-82 (Dec. 2003).
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shareholders, banks appear to have been involved in
facilitating the improper trading. 2
IV. THE TRANSACTION AND RELATIONSHIP OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE
It is first important to recognize that FHC investment
bankers are not the only ones attracted to dysfunctional inner
circles. Evidence from the scandals shows that investment
bankers from banks unaffiliated with FHCs, commercial
bankers, accountants, and lawyers willingly joined corporate
inner circles. 7' The best example may be the former accounting
firm, Arthur Anderson. The Arthur Anderson client
relationship accountants became part of Enron's team and
ignored the restraints of the firm's professional standards
committees, which ultimately led to the firm's demise.74 The
same could be said about the law firms involved in the
scandals, although their liability has yet to be fully established.
Investment bankers may be particularly susceptible to joining
an inner circle because, unlike professional service firms, their
employees are neither restrained by powerful professional
codes of behavior and ethics nor by an ethos of
professionalism.75 As a practical matter, investment bankers
are today little more than "hired guns" with weak
commitments to their current employer investment bank and
more loyalty to their corporate clients, whom they often bring
along to any new employer. This client-based loyalty may be
particularly acute with bankers affiliated with FHCs because,
in order to compete with established investment banks like
72 See, e.g., Press release, SEC, SEC Reaches Agreement in Principle to Settle
Charges Against Bank of America for Market Timing and Late Trading (March 15,
2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-33.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
" See Third Report of Neal Batson, supra note 29, at 81-85 (discussing role
of Merrill Lynch in Enron's fraud); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and ERISA
Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d. 549, 656-86 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing involvement of law
firms and accountants in Enron's fraud).
74 See In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d at 673-85.
75 It is true that investment bankers are governed by codes of conduct and
certification administered by the National Association of Securities Dealers. See
generally NASD website, at http://www.nasdr.com. However, bankers generally do not
receive school and professional training of the order of accountants and lawyers. Of




Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, the FHCs have hired teams
of bankers away from them."6
The inner circle attraction that is central to the
reformulated subtle hazards analysis is particularly serious for
the FHC. The legal structure of regulation of these complex
institutions or LCBOs makes it difficult for regulators to
address adequately this problem. Under the law, there is
diverse, functional regulation of the different parts of FHCs.77
The SEC regulates investment banks, insurance regulators
oversee the insurance firms, bank regulators govern the
commercial bank, and the Federal Reserve the FHC. In other
words, with the exception to be discussed in more detail below,
a FHC is not responsible to a super-regulator, which would
logically be the Federal Reserve. 8 Yet, as I noted in discussing
the Enron scandal, this functional regulation contrasts with
the manner in which FHCs deliver their services today. They
offer, and their clients come to expect, a panoply of different
financial services, often through teams of bankers drawn from
different parts of the financial institution. It is thus easy for an
inner circle's influence to reach throughout a FHC by the client
team, composed of investment and commercial bankers, while
it is hard for regulators, focused as they are on different parts
of the FHC's business, and even for the FHC's top executives,
to control the problem before it is too late."
Bank regulators, I contend, must be sensitive to the risk
of corruption ensuing from FHC bankers identifying
76 In effect, financial institutions, such as Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley,
are among the largest financial conglomerates and operate some of the largest
commercial banks in the country. See Large Commercial Banks, Federal Reserve
Statistics Release, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004) (indicating that, as of June 30, 2004, they rank 64 and 57,
respectively, in terms of consolidated assets among commercial banks chartered in the
United States). See also Statistics on Depository Institutions, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. (indicating that as of June 30, 2003, Merrill Lynch was 11th in terms
of total deposits among FDIC-insured commercial banks and savings institutions), at
http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/sodSumReport.asp?slnfoAsOf=20032sAreas=2barItem=3 (last
visited Oct. 26, 2004). Through various regulatory loopholes, however, they are not
regulated as FHCs and thus have less of a regulatory burden than does Citigroup or JP
Morgan Chase.
77 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844 (2004).
78 See MACEY, supra note 19, at 437.
79 The team approach of FHC towards clients is reflected in the FHC's risk
analysis, which is designed to review all the activities of all of its divisions with respect
to a particular client. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, How Should We Respond to the Growing
Risks of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAHAM-
LEACH-BLILEY 36-39 (Patricia C. McCoy ed., 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=291859 (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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themselves too closely with a client's inner circle and must take
action to prevent its recurrence. It is important that bank
regulators are looking more closely at FHC involvement in
structured finance8 and that, in accordance with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC has enhanced the disclosure of
public company off-balance sheet activities and techniques that
were used in the scandals.8 ' However, this addresses only the
most recent manifestation of the inner circle problem. The next
wave of scandals involving corporations and FHCs could be
based upon a different scheme or abuse. Yet an effective
regulatory response is a tall order, especially when the entire
focus of FHCs is to deliver the institutions to the clients, when
even the chief executives of the FHCs may favor client inner
circles," and when investment bankers are often all powerful
barons in these financial conglomerates. Moreover, because the
risk of a loss of consumer confidence that could arise from the
FHC's loss of reputation from a scandal is real, although as yet
unapparent in the current scandals, regulators cannot ignore
the problem.'
8' See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-511, INVESTMENT
BANKS: THE ROLE OF FIRMS AND THEIR ANALYSTS REPORT WITH ENRON AND GLOBAL
CROSSING 23 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/atext/d03511.txt (last visited Oct.
26, 2004); Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured
Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980 (May 19, 2004).
"' See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley], Pub. L. No.
107-204 § 409, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of titles 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 of the U.S.C.) (entitled "Real Time Issuer Disclosures" and adding subsection (1) to
15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (2004), to disclose accurately off-balance sheet items); id. at § 401
(entitled "Disclosure in Periodic Reports" and adding, among other things, a new
subsection (j) to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (2004), which requires that the SEC promulgate
rules mandating annual and quarterly reports to disclose "material off-balance sheet
transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations) and other
relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may have
a material current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial
condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or
significant components of revenues or expenses"); Disclosure in Management's
Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate
Contractual Obligations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,982 (Feb. 5, 2003) (final rule) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis
About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent
Liabilities and Commitments, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,054 (proposed Nov. 8, 2002) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249).
82 The best example of this may well be the closeness of Citigroup's Chairman
and former CEO Sandy Weill to many company client CEOs. See, e.g., In re Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc., supra note 69, at 36-45 (discussing Weill's efforts to have analyst
Jack Grubman change his rating of AT&T).
Arguably, regulators should be especially concerned about this reputation
risk because executives of the largest financial conglomerates believe that regulators
will always rescue them, despite the law that is supposed to prevent bank regulators
from keeping large banks from failing. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Transformation of
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One possible solution is that regulators should require
FHCs to implement a firm-wide transaction and relationship
oversight committee at the highest level. This committee would
then be empowered to review, regulate, and veto-if
necessary-transactions, products, and client relationships.
The Federal Reserve also has the power to impose on a FHC
this kind of committee-a committee that already exists in
some FHCs. The Federal Reserve has the authority to prevent
unsafe or unsound practices that present a risk to the safety
and soundness of banks, and certainly the involvement of FHC
bankers in client inner circles counts as a dangerous practice.'
Moreover, following the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, the
Federal Reserve has taken a special supervisory role with
respect to LCBOs that involves an understanding of the overall
risks of the organization.' In this regard, the Federal Reserve
demands an evaluation of legal and reputation risks, and the
reformulated subtle hazard of the inner circle falls within this
category. Indeed, following the corporate scandals and the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Federal Reserve asked FHC
examiners to ensure that FHCs had policies and internal
control structures in place so that upper management could
monitor the diverse activities of the organization.'
the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and
Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 446-50 (2002) (discussing continued existence of
"too big to fail" doctrine among financial regulators).
See 12 U.S.C.A. §1844 (2004). Admittedly, that provision and 12 U.S.C.A. §
1848a (2004) imposed limitations on the Federal Reserve's power to examine and
regulate subsidiaries of holding companies that were otherwise regulated, but these
restrictions are subject to the "unsafe or unsound practice" exception.
See DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 7, at 47. But see Wilmarth, supra note
83, at 454-75 (arguing that this supervision has been ineffective in allowing banking
regulators to oversee the entire organization).
8 See FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 3, § 2010.0, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanualbhc/bhc06O4.pdf (last visited Oct.
26, 2004) (recommending that examiners insist upon written policies of parent
company supervision in decentralized holding company structures); id. at § 2060.05.1
(discussing internal audit, which is the group, reporting to the audit committee, that
ensures that all divisions of the FHC are following the firm's policies and the law); §
2060.4 (dealing with the reporting structure up the chain in the FHC and management
information systems); id. at § 5010.14 (requiring an examiner to see whether a holding
company has in place formal policies to minimize risk). Sarbanes-Oxley enhanced the
importance of internal controls in a public firm (which FHCs generally are) by
imposing a requirement that chief executives certify that their company has an
adequate system of internal controls. See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 81, § 404
("Management Assessment of Internal Controls"); Certification of Disclosure in
Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002) (final
rule) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274); Certification of
Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,508 (proposed
Aug. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249); Certification of Disclosure
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Moreover, in response to the involvement of particular
FHCs in the corporate scandals, the Federal Reserve required
offending institutions to adopt or to strengthen existing
oversight committees. The written agreement" between
Citigroup and the Federal Reserve regarding the FHC's
participation in the Enron transactions required, among other
things, that Citigroup develop a "legal and reputational risk
management program." This program was intended to identify
where transactions pose "heightened legal or reputational
risks" to Citigroup, to ensure that these risks are evaluated
with respect to transactions, and to ensure that appropriately
senior personnel consider the risks.' The program also
stipulated that there be a "higher level review of the overall
customer relationship between the counterparty and Citigroup
and its subsidiaries independent of the business line" in
situations of heightened risk,89 which could serve to prevent
bankers from pulling the institution into the designs of the
inner circle. Even more specifically, the Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce (CIBC) and the Federal Reserve (as well as
the Canadian banking regulator) entered into a written
agreement to address CIBC's participation in the Enron
scandal.' As part of the agreement, CIBC was required to
establish a Financial Transaction Oversight Committee
(FTOC), composed of senior representatives of the FHC's
departments, including legal and accounting, that had to pre-
approve all structured finance activities and any other
transaction in which a member of the committee felt that the
in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (June 20, 2002) (to
be codifed at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249) (offering a proposed rule before passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley because investors were losing confidence that executives are paying
attention to company disclosure). See also Management's Report on Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic
Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228,
229, 240, 249, 270, 274) (final rule under which executives of a public company must
report on and certify internal control systems in their company).
87 A written agreement is a quasi-formal action that bank regulators take,
with the consent of the regulated party, to address a problem with the latter. See
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 300 (2d ed. 2003).
Written Agreement by and between Citigroup Inc. & Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, supra note 43, at 3-4.
" See id. at 5. J.P. Morgan Chase entered into a similar agreement with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Banking Authority. See
Written Agreement by and among J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., supra note 55, at 4-5.
98 See Agreement by and among Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, The
Superintendent of Financial Institutions & Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Dec.
22, 2003), at http'J/www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/newscentre/newsrelease/pdf/agreement-e.pdf
(last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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Committee's approval was necessary or that an employee had
referred to the Committee. In deciding whether to approve a
transaction, the Committee had to evaluate, among other
things, the reputation risk that it posed to CIBC.9'
Most significantly, the new Interagency Statement on
Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured Finance
Activities (the Statement) recommends policies that have the
effect of preventing FHCs and other financial institutions from
participating in transactions generated by company inner
circles (through "captured" investment bankers).' As the
Statement explains, because structured finance is not a
commoditized product and instead is tailored to fit a company's
specific needs, it is particularly susceptible to being used by an
inner circle to further its interests at the expense of the
company. Additionally, being complex, structured financing
involves the participation of different professionals. 3 From the
social psychological perspective adopted here, this means that
a company's inner circle may well enlist multiple parties in
these transactions that advance its, not the company's, goals.
The Statement recognizes that a financial institution's
participation in, and structuring of, these transactions may
lead it to incur the kinds of legal risks seen in the case of
Citigroup with Enron and, more significantly, the risk that the
financial institution's existence may be threatened if its
reputation is tarnished.' In a psychologically astute manner,
the Statement recommends that there be established
91 See id. at app., at 2-5. In addition, CIBC employees are encouraged to
report problematic transactions to the FTOC, and CIBC has to develop a web site that,
among other things, provides a means for communications by employees to the FTOC.
12 See Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex
Structured Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980 (May 19, 2004). In the past, banking
agencies have proposed guidelines for financial institutions with respect to particular
transactions that posed legal and other risks to them. See, e.g., OCC Examining
Circular on Leveraged Buyouts and Other Forms of Leveraged Transactions, [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,529 (Dec. 14, 1988) (proposing
guidelines on a bank's involvement with highly-leveraged transactions). I owe this
observation to Brandon Becker.
9' See Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex
Structured Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980, 28,985 (May 19, 2004).
See id. at 28,981. As recent events have highlighted, financial institutions
may face substantial legal risk to the extent they participate in complex structured
finance transactions that are used by customers to circumvent regulatory or financial
reporting requirements, evade tax liabilities, or further other illegal or improper
behavior by the customer. Involvement in such transactions also may damage an
institution's reputation and franchise value. Reputational risk poses a major threat to
financial institutions because the nature of their business requires maintaining the
confidence of customers, creditors, and the general marketplace.
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procedures for approving and monitoring these transactions,
particularly to involve financial institution members other
than the relationship bankers and employees in the same line
of business as the questionable transaction.9 Furthermore, the
Statement strongly recommends that financial institutions
adopt the senior transaction oversight committee structure," or
at least require transaction oversight by senior executives,
reasoning that this committee will have the institutional power
and the distance from transactions to be able to decide whether
the financial institution should even engage in them.7 While
the Statement is powerful, it would have added authority if it
were based explicitly on a social psychological foundation.
How effective can this transaction and relationship
oversight committee be and what can be done to enhance its
effectiveness? Will the committee be able to identify and veto
transactions that raise issues of reputation and legal risk,
especially when FHCs are competing so vigorously to win and
keep corporate clients? The committee may never see
problematic transactions until it is too late, may be too weak to
oppose them (because it is not composed of significant
executives), or may be too co-opted to police the transactions
(because its members are "team inclined" and representative of
95 See id. at 28,986.
See id. In part, the Statement reads as follows:
In order to manage the risks associated with complex structured finance
transactions, some institutions have established a senior management
committee that is designed to ensure that all of the relevant control functions
within the financial institution, including independent risk management,
accounting policy, legal, and financial control, are involved in the oversight of
complex structured finance transactions. The goal of such a senior-level risk
control committee is to ensure that those complex structured finance
activities that may expose the financial institution to higher levels of
financial, legal and reputational risk are comprehensively and consistently
managed and controlled on a company-wide basis. This senior management
committee regularly reviews trends in new products and complex structured
transaction activity, including overall risk exposures from such transactions,
and typically provides final approval of the most complicated or controversial
complex structured finance transactions. The agencies believe that such a
senior-level committee can serve as an important part of an effective control
infrastructure for complex structured finance activities.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also id. at 28,987 ("Policies should clearly define the types of
circumstances where the approval of transactions or patterns of transactions should be
elevated to higher levels of financial institution management for reasons specific to
legal or reputational risk.").
97 The Statement also provides a non-exclusive list of the kinds of
transactions that should be subject to scrutiny by whatever review process the
financial institution adopts. Many of these were used by Enron insiders with the help
of financial institutions. See Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning
Complex Structured Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. at 28,988 (May 19, 2004).
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the interested FHC divisions and client relationships). In
addition, a FHC's complexity makes it difficult for bank
examiners to determine whether the committee is functionally
independent or merely window dressing.
There is little reason to be overly optimistic about the
oversight committee's ability successfully to prevent a
recurrence of the reformulated subtle hazards. But I see no
choice other than to experiment with it as a way of countering
the inner circle attraction that is likely to continue to affect and
corrupt FHCs. The oversight committee would have the best
chance of success if it reported to knowledgeable outsiders,
such as the FHC board members, who may be better positioned
to resist the excessive client-driven orientation of the financial
institution. After all, it will be difficult to make the committee
fully effective, even with bank examinations, without resisting
this orientation. The obvious answer is to have the committee
regularly report to the board's audit committee, composed as it
is of independent directors and assigned the task of supervising
the internal audit function of the FHC.' Indeed, the Statement
proposes board oversight over a financial institution's
involvement in structured finance," and it would do better by
recommending direct supervision by the audit committee. I
recognize that this recommendation may just move the problem
out a step since the effectiveness of audit committee oversight
presumes that this committee is composed of active, critical
board members who are themselves immune to the team
mentality-the kind of people who, frankly, do not appear
today to populate boards or even to be independent directors."
98 On the audit committee generally, see Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley
(entitled "Public Company Audit Committees"), adding a new subsection (m) to 15
U.S.C.A. § 78f (2004). This provision directs national securities exchanges and
associations to prohibit listing a security of a company that does not have an audit
committee in accordance with the standards set forth by the Act. The SEC
implemented Section 301 by its rule-making, which in turn affects stock exchange
rules. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg.
18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (final rule) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249,
274); Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 2,638
(proposed Jan. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274). It is
possible that the oversight committee could report to another board committee, such as
a Risk Management Committee, with particular competence in the transaction review
area. See OCC, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
DIRECTORS 13 (Jan. 1998) (referring to possible committees of a bank's board),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/directorsl.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
99 See Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex
Structured Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. at 28,985-86 (May 19, 2004).
180 See generally Fanto, supra note 27.
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The Federal Reserve could also increase the transaction
oversight committee's likelihood of success by insisting that its
members include senior executives, as well as legal and other
compliance officers, and that the committee have a charter that
is widely distributed throughout the firm.0 1 The charter would
not only put FHC employees on notice about the dangers of
client inner circles, but it would also give the oversight
committee rules of behavior that would enable them to resist
the attraction of these circles when bankers advocate specific
transactions.' °' Moreover, bank examiners would be directed to
regularly review the oversight committee's minutes and
performance as part of the current special review of LCBOs for
legal and reputation risks and look for situations suggesting
that a committee has been too passive (e.g., where it has not
vetoed any transactions or client relationships).
V. CONCLUSION
Increasingly, it seems like a distant age when banks
were only banks, rather than integral components of today's
FHCs. Camp's subtle hazards appear similarly archaic based
as they were upon the efforts of commercial bankers to support
affiliated investment banks and their corporate clients because
of their fear of depositors' irrational action, efforts which might
nevertheless threaten banks' solvency.
I have argued that FHC involvement in the recent
corporate scandals provides empirical support for a
reformulation of the subtle hazards risks. Investment bankers'
involvement with dysfunctional inner circles of corporate
clients can pull the bankers, the investment bank, commercial
bankers-indeed the entire FHC-into the corruption of the
circle. This risk is exacerbated by the current "deliver the
institution" and team approach of FHCs in providing their
services to corporate clients. This risk could lead to the same
result feared by the Court in Camp: because of its involvement
101 Again, as noted above, the Interagency Statement recommends the
involvement of senior officials and legal personnel in the review of structured
financing, see Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex
Structured Finance Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. at 28,986-87, and it, too, calls for
establishing policies regarding transactions that are circulated throughout the
financial institution, see id.
102 See generally JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW




with a particular inner circle, a FHC could suffer significant
legal and, most importantly, reputational harm, with
potentially disastrous institutional consequences. I have
supported my argument for the reformulated subtle hazards by
reference to evidence about the significant involvement of
FHCs in the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom.
My proposal to deal with the reformulated subtle
hazards is to implement a transactions and relationship
oversight committee whose main mission will be to prevent the
FHC from falling under the influence of a client inner circle.
Without being too optimistic about the effectiveness of this
committee, I argue that regulators have little choice but to
implement it, as they already have in some FHCs involved in
the scandals. As has been suggested in the Interagency
Statement regarding structured finance, regulators must try to
entrust the committee with powers that will enhance its
effectiveness: by requiring it to be composed of senior
executives and legal and compliance officers, by having it
report to the board audit committee, by formalizing and
publicizing its procedures, and by rigorously reviewing its
performance as part of the examination of legal and reputation
risks within the special examination accorded to LCBOs.
Without this reform, it is almost certain that FHCs run the
risk of again becoming instruments of their corporate clients'
inner circles.
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